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Abstract 
We examine the link between the managers' option compensation 
and the optimism bias in management earnings forecasts. More par-
ticularly, we are interested in investigating the extent of self-serving 
optimism in the earnings forecasts made by managers with a high 
amount of option compensation. We hypothesize that managements' 
optimism (optimism bias in their earnings forecasts) increases with 
an increase in their stock option compensation. We provide evidence 
that managers issue optimistic forecasts since their compensation is 
a function of the stock price, and optimistic earnings forecasts usu-
ally result in a higher share price. 
Keywords: Forecast error, management earnings forecasts, opti-
mism bias, option compensation. 
JEL Classification: G0; G1; G3; M4 
Introduction 
Will management, with significant option compensation, behave 
differently when issuing their earnings forecasts?  Research suggests 
that the variation in managements' behavior is linked to the timing 
of their stock-option compensation (Yermack, 1997; Aboody & 
Kasznik, 2000; Cheng and Lo, 2006; McAnally, Srivastava & 
Weaver, 2008) and managing earnings through discretionary accru-
als (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Gong, Li & Xie, 2009).  For 
example, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Gong et al., (2009) 
report that managers with significant stock and option holdings have 
more flexibility, and use discretionary accruals to manage earnings. 
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Given these findings, it seems appropriate to ask whether 
optimistic forecast biases are reflected in higher portions of com-
pensation arrangements: Will management with significant option 
compensation behave differently when issuing an earnings forecasts?  
We address the question by studying the effect of CEO compensa-
tion on CEO optimism, since CEOs are most likely to have the 
strongest influence on earnings forecasts.  
Prior evidence demonstrates that management possesses 
considerable discretion in choosing the frequency, precision, and 
horizon of their forecasts (Choi, Myers, Zang, & Ziebart, 2010; Choi, 
Myers, Zang, & Ziebart, 2011; Chi & Ziebart, 2014; Chi & Ziebart, 
2017).  Accordingly, managers with higher levels of stock options 
have incentives to increase forecast optimism due to the market’s 
pricing of good news when the forecasts are issued.  In addition, Chi 
& Ziebart (2019) suggest attributes of management earnings fore-
casts may indicate managements’ intentions to manage earnings that 
may result in a restatement.  
Since we are interested in forecast bias, we examine the time 
period between March 2001 and September 2001, when the dot-com 
bubble4 burst but the Great Recession5 has not started. Indeed, there 
may have been hyper-optimism just prior to the Great Recession. 
Our sample fits a time period with a small trough followed by a rapid 
recovery.  This rapid recovery may have given optimism to the 
CEOs and others that nothing too bad would occur. We therefore 
expect to see a significant amount of management optimism in the 
data. 
In this study, we investigate the question, whether managers 
are more optimistic in their earnings forecasts or guidance when 
their compensation is composed of a higher proportion of stock op-
                                                 
4During the bull market in the late 1990s, investments in internet-based firms 
fuelled a rapid rise in equity valuations of U.S. technology firms. This resulted in 
an exponential growth in equity markets between the period 1995 to 2000, creat-
ing a dot-com bubble -also known as the tech bubble and the internet bubble. The 
bubble burst in 2001, causing the equities to enter a bear market in 2001 and 
through 2002. 
5The period of general economic decline, between December 2007 and June 2009 
(NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee) 
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tions?  We focus on whether the extent of option compensation pro-
vides incremental explanatory power in explaining management 
earnings forecast bias (defined as the difference between the actual 
earnings and the forecasted earnings scaled by stock price)? 
We argue that managers having higher option compensation 
issue optimistic earnings forecasts since higher equity values indi-
rectly increase their compensation. Consequently, optimism in earn-
ings forecasts should increase with an increase in the proportion of 
stock options in managerial compensation. While we focus on man-
agement earnings forecasts, other prior research suggests that CEO 
stock option compensation is associated with earnings management.  
Tying management compensation to the firm’s share price incentiv-
izes the managers to issue optimistic forecasts (Noe, 1999; Nagar, 
Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; Cheng & Lo, 2006). Prior studies indicate 
that voluntary disclosures by insiders are usually optimistic (Pen-
man, 1980; Waymire 1984; Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson & Sefcik, 
1992; McConomy, 1998; and Clarkson, 2000). 
Accounting research has given considerable attention to the 
impact of stock option plans on accounting methods and disclosure 
choices (Yermack, 1997; Aboody & Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin & 
Shenoy, 2001; Bartov & Mohanram, 2004; Coles, Hertzel & Kalpa-
thy, 2006; and McAnally et al. 2008).  These studies suggest oppor-
tunist timing of the option-grant date (Yermack, 1997) and voluntary 
disclosures (Aboody and Kasznick, 2000) to increase stock-option 
compensation value. McAnally et al. (2008) find that managers ac-
celerate bad-news announcements and delay good-news earnings 
announcements surrounding the grant date. 
Other studies focus on links between option compensation 
and firm performance (Guay, 1999; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 
1999; Hanlon, Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2003), investment decisions 
(Smith & Watts 1992; Bizjak, Brickley & Coles, 1993), and divi-
dend policy (Lambert, Lanen & Larcker, 1989).  However, little ev-
idence exists regarding whether the stock option compensation in-
fluences management earnings forecasts during the period we ex-
amine.  We extend the literature by examining whether managers 
apparently self-interested, voluntary disclosures undermine the use-
fulness of management earnings guidance. 
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In our study we contribute to the management disclosure and 
forecast literature regarding management forecast bias by providing 
evidence that managers express their self-serving interest by issuing 
upwardly biased (more optimistic) earnings forecasts.  Similarly, the 
results of our study contribute to the option compensation literature.  
Our results suggest that before drafting changes to accounting stand-
ards or proposing disclosure-related policies, regulators and stand-
ard setters must consider that voluntary disclosures are intentionally 
biased in certain circumstances.  Improving firms’ information en-
vironment may not occur if the firms’ disclosures are due to manag-
ers’ self-interests. 
Our sample consists of 39,120 yearly forecasts of EPS made 
by management (9,905 firms) during the period 1998 to 2005. In our 
analysis, we document a negative link between the forecast bias (ac-
tual earnings minus forecasted earnings) and the magnitude of the 
managers' stock option compensation. In our analyses, we examine 
both the CEO’s option compensation and the option compensation 
of non-CEO executives. While our study finds evidence linking the 
magnitude of option compensation to forecast optimism, we believe 
a good portion of the optimism may be due to the particular time 
period selected.  This suggests that results concerning our docu-
mented effect may vary by the general optimism in the economy. 
We present a detailed literature review in the next section, 
followed by hypothesis development. We discuss methodology and 
present the empirical results in sections three and four, respectively. 
We conclude in section five. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Stock Option Compensation 
The compensation committee of the board of directors usually 
makes the option awards once a year, although there can be multiple 
awards. These awards better align shareholder and management in-
terests and reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since 
options increase interest alignment, corporate boards increase stock 
option awards to top-level executives (Yermack, 1995; Lakonishok 
& Lee, 2001; Balsam, 2002). The size and timing of the awards vary 
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across companies at the discretion of the company compensation 
committee. 
In most large companies, the stock option compensation, 
valued using the Black-Scholes approach, is the largest single com-
ponent of managerial compensation (Hall & Leibman, 1998; Mur-
phy, 1999). Much of the prior research on option compensation fo-
cuses on the link of compensation with firm performance (Core et 
al., 1999; Guay, 1999; Hanlon et al., 2003). Various prior studies 
examine the link between option compensation and management in-
vestment decisions (Smith &Watts,1992; Bizjak et al., 1993).  In ad-
dition, Lambert et al. (1989) investigate the relation of option com-
pensation and dividend policy. 
2.2. Stock Option Compensation and Stock Price 
Managers have considerable discretion in their forecasting behavior 
(Choi et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2011) and can personally benefit from 
boosting stock price. Particularly, managers may try to benefit from 
a boost in the stock price by issuing an overly optimistic forecast 
(Noe, 1999; Nagar et al., 2003; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Cheng 
&Lo, 2006). Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) document 
that managers may attempt to boost stock price if they are planning 
to sell some of their shares or options. Option compensation gives 
managers incentives to increase the stock price. 
Hall and Liebman (1998) find that stock options form a sig-
nificant proportion (20%) of the managers' compensation. Accord-
ingly, stock option compensation gives managers a powerful reason 
to increase the company’s stock prices by optimistically biasing 
their earnings forecasts and increasing the stock prices. Nagar et al. 
(2003) point out that a manager’s compensation and wealth is sen-
sitive to a firm’s share price. Managers who own shares of the firm 
or options will gain from a boost in the stock price (Aboody & Kasz-
nik 2000).  
 This study provides evidence that stock price is very im-
portant for management with option compensation. Accordingly, 
managers with large equity incentives are motivated to care greatly 
about the firms’ stock prices, and optimistic earnings forecasts allow 
them to directly impact stock price. 
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2.3. Opportunistic Managerial Behavior and Optimistic Bias 
McNichols (1989) confirms that managers face penalties for volun-
tarily issuing biased forecasts.  However, despite the penalties such 
as reputation loss, legal actions, and negative stock returns, compa-
nies still fail to meet the earnings forecasts they issued (Trueman, 
1986; Kasznik, 1999). Numerous empirical studies including Yer-
mack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) examine managers' 
opportunistic behaviors in relation to the stock options awards. Re-
search regarding earnings forecast optimism, focus primarily on 
tradeoffs between forecasting optimism and inaccurate disclosures 
or earnings guidance. Frost (1997) and Rogers and Stocken (2005) 
provide incentives for managers to be optimistic in their forecasts 
and inflate market expectations. Since numerous incentives may ex-
ist for being optimistic, Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995), 
Lang and Lundholm (2000), and Jo and Kim (2007) focus on earn-
ings forecasts around equity offerings. Since, management forecasts 
are influential to investors (Hirst, Koonce & Venkataraman, 2008; 
Pownall, Wasley & Waymire, 1993), managers compensated with 
stock options will optimistically bias their forecasts. 
2.4. Hypotheses Development 
Will management with significant option compensation behave dif-
ferently when issuing management earnings forecasts? Managers 
with flexibility to manage their earnings to meet or beat their own 
earnings forecasts are more likely to issue optimistic management 
earnings forecasts. Managers with high option-based compensation 
may be induced to increase short-term stock price, manage account-
ing earnings through accruals or real earnings management, and to 
issue optimistic earnings forecasts. Thus, managers with significant 
option compensation are likely to be optimistic in their forecast due 
to the benefits resulting from higher stock prices and higher values 
for the stock options they hold.  This reasoning underlies our hy-
pothesis as follows: 
H1: The management earnings forecasts of firms where the execu-
tives have high levels of option compensation will be optimistically 
biased.  
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This hypothesis suggests a negative association between the 
management earnings forecast optimism bias (based on the differ-
ence between actual earnings and forecasted earnings) and the exec-
utives’ stock-option compensation. 
3. Methodology 
In our analysis, we focus on whether a large amount of stock option 
compensation motivates management to issue optimistic earnings 
forecasts and earnings guidance. Our regression analysis investi-
gates the magnitude of option compensation for both the company’s 
CEOs and the non-CEO executives using a Black-Scholes valuation 
model and the forecast bias in the management earnings forecasts. 
Using a common regression approach, we include various control 
variables in line with prior studies. In Section 4.2 we discuss these 
variables and provide references for their use in prior studies. 
3.1. Sample Selection 
Our sample contains 9,905 management forecasts from 1998 to 
2005 comprising CEO and Non-CEO stock option grants priced us-
ing Black-Scholes valuation methodology. The management fore-
casts of yearly earnings per share are obtained from the First Call 
database. We merge the First Call observations with COMPUSTAT 
Fundamental yearly database (firm specific variables), IBES (ana-
lyst following information), ExecuComp (CEO compensation) and 
Thomson Reuters (institutional ownership and outside directors). 
We remove forecasts where we were unable to obtain the requisite 
data for our analysis. In Table 1,we describe the data filtering pro-
cess and the resulting sample6. 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from the First Call 
database from 1998 to 2005 inclusive  
56,532 
Forecast Missing COMPUSTAT data (28,571) 
Forecast Missing IBES data (11,891) 
Forecast Missing ExecuComp data (4,028) 
Forecast Missing THOMSON REUTERS data (2,137) 
                                                 
6 We drop firms in the upper and lower one percent of the distributions as outliers. 
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Number of Management Forecasts for CEO Compensation in 
the Final Sample 
9,905 
Number of Management Forecasts for Non- CEO Compensa-
tion  in the Final Sample 
29,215 
 
Total Number of Management Forecasts in the Final Sample 39,120 
Number of Firms in the Final Sample 9,905 
We include both CEOs and non-CEO executives in our anal-
ysis since both may have significant influence over the earnings 
forecasts. The observations for which the CEOs hold the office for 
the full fiscal year and for which firm-specific data are available, are 
retained in the final sample. 
In Table 2, we present the mean values for the CEO and Non-
CEO stock option compensation. The mean CEO stock option com-
pensation increases substantially from 44.36 in 1998 to a high of 
99.75 in 2001 and then declines to 50.52 in 2005.  We believe that 
this decline is likely due to the requirement that stock options be 
expensed (Carter, Lynch, & Tuna, 2007). However, the mean Non-
CEO stock option compensation is lower and remains much more 
stable. During our study period, the mean Non-CEO stock option 
compensation ranges between 20.18 and 33.76, with the exception 
of 40.26 in 2001. Overall, the ratios of Non-CEO compensation 
(Non-CEO_BLK) to CEO compensation (CEO_BLK) for the 
years1998 to 2005 are approximately 45, 43, 44, 40, 41, 34, and 34 
percent, respectively. 
Table 2 
Distribution of management forecasts across years 
Statistics of Black-Scholes 
 CEO_BLK Non-CEO_ BLK 
Year N Mean 
(000’s) 
N Mean (000’s) 
1998 1,129 44.36 3,268 20.18 
1999 1,139 68.28 3,341 29.58 
2000 1,185 76.62 3,379 33.76 
2001 1,191 99.75 3,401 40.26 
2002 1,237 72.86 3,672 29.99 
2003 1,328 79.57 4,038 33.14 
2004 1,374 66.04 4,148 22.57 
2005 1,322 50.52 3,968 17.47 
n 9,905 29,215 
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Note: This table presents the summary statistics of variables of interest based for the sample of CEO 
and Non-CEO compensations by year. 
We provide descriptive statistics in Table 3. The mean fore-
cast bias (BIAS) of -0.0226 indicates an optimistic bias on average 
of about 2 percent of the lagged stock price. Overall, the dollar value 
of the CEO's option compensation (CEO_BLK) from 1998 to 2005 
is $69.72 (000’s), which is much higher than the mean Non-CEO 
compensation of $28.1562 (000’s).  
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Characteristics 
Variable x̅ x̃ Min Max σ  n 
BIAS -0.0226 -0.0048 -0.3969 0.0997 0.0584 39,120 
CEO_ 
BLK 
69.7219 22.6962 0.0000 9,082.144 208.4996 9,905 
Non - 
CEO_BLK 
 
28.1565 
 
9.2989 
 
0.0000 
 
3,870.318 
 
85.3086 
 
29,215 
DISP 0.0311 0.0132 -11.0000 64.5000 0.7221 39,120 
SURPRISE 0.0075 0.0041 -3.2458 4.7216 0.1762 39,120 
SIZE 7.6757 7.5518 2.9457 13.1389 1.5532 39,120 
LOSS 0.1442 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3513 39,120 
NANA 2.1265 2.1972 0.6930 3.7800 0.7403 39,120 
HORIZON 3.4722 3.4339 1.3863 6.5582 0.4173 39,120 
STDROE 1.6296 0.6683 0.0007 1948.9000 27.0658 39,120 
EL 1.3857 1.36420 0.2463 3.4986 0.7352 39,120 
OUTDIR 64.3621 65.3785 52.6946 72.6426 15.9463 39,120 
INST 58.1437 60.5143 44.0478 69.8693 25.4636 39,120 
LITIGATE 0.3205 0.1954 0.0000 1.6478 0.4961 39,120 
MKBK 4.826 3.4871 2.3584 5.2164 5.4759 39,120 
Note: Number of Observations = n; Standard Deviation = σ; x̅ = Mean; x̃ = Median 
3.2. Dependent Variable – Forecast Bias 
As previously described, management forecasting bias (BIAS) is 
measured as the value of forecasting error scaled by stock price at 
time t-17. Deflating forecast bias by the beginning of the year stock 
price controls for the cross-sectional differences in earnings levels 
and reduces the interaction between forecast bias in the numerator 
and price changes in the denominator. A forecast is considered opti-
                                                 
7 To ensure consistency, the actual earnings and forecasted earnings are from First 
Call. 
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mistic if it exceeds the actual earnings. We use the most recent earn-
ings forecast in instances where the management provides multiple 
forecasts8. The bias (BIAS) in our management earnings forecasts is 
computed as9: 
BIASt =  (Actualt - Forecast EPSt ) /Pricet-1 
Table 4 
The earnings forecast is optimistic when BIASt< 0. 
BIASt = Actual minus forecast EPS  deflated by stock price 
FORECASTt = Management earnings forecast of annual primary EPS for 
year t 
EPSt = Actual annual primary EPS for year t 
PRICEt-1 = Stock price at the end of period t-1 
Since management earnings forecasts can be point, range, or 
other types, we focus on point and range forecasts. For range fore-
casts, we use the mid-point of the range10. 
3.3. Statistical Analysis 
We regress the management earnings forecast bias on the compen-
sation variables while controlling for variables that affect manage-
ment earnings forecast bias in line with prior studies. We provide all 
variable definitions in the appendix. The model is as follow11: 
BIAS = α0 +α1 CEO_BLK+ α2 NON-CEO_BLK + α3DISP + 
α4SURPRISE + α5SIZE+ α6LOSS + α7NANA+ α8HORIZON + 
α9STDROE+α10EL + α11OUTDIR + α12INST + α13LITIGATE + 
α14MKBK + YEAR + ε                                                                (1) 
Non-CEO options granted (NON-CEO_BLK) includes 
board chairman, CFO, vice president, or chief operating officer. 
                                                 
8 Our regression employs firm-clustering since there are multiple observations 
from the same firm across different years. 
9 Extreme BIAS observations are removed as outliers (about 1 percent of the dis-
tribution). 
10 The mid-point of the range has been used extensively in prior research (for ex-
ample, see Baginski et al 1993; Hirst 1999). 
11 In order to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity, we apply White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity constant standard errors for the regression analysis in 
this study. 
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Atiase and Bamber (1994) use analysts’ forecast dispersion 
(DISP) to measure predisclosure information, while Ajinkya,Atiase 
&Gift, (1991) use it as a proxy for investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
Imhoff and Lobo (1992) use analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion 
as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty, while Ziebart (1990) uses it as 
a measure of differential beliefs. 
In line with Lang and Lundholm (1996), we include the 
earnings surprise (SURPRISE) in our analysis to control for the sign 
and magnitude of realized earnings. Lang and Lundholm (1996) ar-
gue that higher changes in earnings are associated with a less accu-
rate forecast. The loss indicator (LOSS) equals one when actual 
earnings are negative, and zero otherwise. Hwang,Jan & Basu, 
(1996) report that analysts’ forecasts are less accurate when a loss is 
reported than when a profit is reported. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) report a positive association of 
forecast accuracy with company size (SIZE) and the number of an-
alysts following the company (NANA). Consistent with Bhushan 
1989, we use analyst coverage to proxy for private information pro-
duction (Bhushan 1989). 
Kross, Ro & Schroeder (1990) find analysts’ earnings fore-
casts to be less accurate when firms experience higher earnings vol-
atility (STDROE). STDROE is the coefficient of variation in earn-
ings over the prior five years. Following Richardson et al. (2005) 
and Choi et al. (2010), we include forecast horizon (HORIZON) as 
a forecast announced closer to the actual earnings announcement 
date (short forecast horizon) is expected to be more accurate (Das & 
Saudagaran, 1998; Brown, 1993). In addition, both Kang, O’Brien, 
and Sivaramakrishnan (1994) and Das et al. (1998) find evidence 
that longer horizon forecasts are more optimistic. Choi and Ziebart 
(2004) find management earnings forecasts with a horizon of three 
months or less are pessimistic, while management forecasts with a 
horizon of more than seven months are optimistic. Eames and 
Glover (2003) report that earnings level (EL) is linked with forecast 
accuracy. We include a yearly indicator variable (YEAR) in case 
forecast precision has a time-dependent trend. 
To complete our analysis, we include variables representing 
corporate governance, litigation risk, and proprietary cost (Francis 
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et al., 1994; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Our 
variables include the proportion of outside board members (OUT-
DIR), the proportion of institutional ownership (INST), an industry 
litigation level indicator (LITIGATE), and the market to book value 
ratio as a proxy for proprietary cost.  
4. Results 
While we do not provide a Pearson correlation table due to space 
limitations, negative correlations (p<0.01) between (CEO and Non-
CEO) stock option compensation and the management forecast bias 
are observed. Almost all other exogenous variables are significantly 
correlated (usually p<0,01) with forecast bias (BIAS). BIAS is neg-
atively correlated with CEO_BLK, NON-CEO_BLK, DISP, HORI-
ZON and LOSS12. BIAS is positively correlated with SURPRISE, 
SIZE, and NANA. These results provide preliminary evidence that 
managers with high stock option compensation issue more optimis-
tic forecasts. 
In order to conduct a complete analysis and provide clear 
inferences, we need to control for the non-option compensation var-
iables in our regression analysis. None of the correlations between 
the explanatory variables appear large enough to present multicol-
linearity problems. Not surprising, the largest correlation (0.66) is 
between the company size and the number of analysts following the 
company (NANA). 
Table 4 presents the results for the effect of forecast bias on 
CEO and non-CEO stock option compensations. Table 4 shows that 
the estimated coefficients for the CEO and non-CEO option com-
pensation variables remain highly significant even after controlling 
for factors expected to influence forecast error and bias (optimism). 
The coefficients of major interest CEO_BLK and NONCEO_BLK 
are negative and significant at p <0.01. From this we infer that the 
larger the option compensation, the more optimistically biased the 
management earnings forecasts are. Consistent with H1, the magni-
tude of CEO and non-CEO stock option compensations is positively 
associated with the degree of optimism in the management earnings 
                                                 
12 Except for the Pearson correlations, all significance levels reported are based 
on a one-tailed test. 
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forecasts. Due to management’s private incentives, the likelihood 
that the forecast will be biased upward (i.e. more optimistic) in-
creases when managers are highly option compensated. 
Model (1): BIAS = α0 + α1CEO_BLK+ α2NON-CEO_BLK + 
α3DISP + α4SURPRISE + α5SIZE+ α6LOSS + α7NANA + 
α8HORIZON + α9STDROE + α10EL + α11OUTDIR + α12INST + 
α13LITIGATE + α14MKBK + YEAR + ε 
Table 5 
Multivariate Test: Management Forecast Error and CEOs Com-
pensation 
 Coefficient 
Intercept -5.3510 
 
CEO_BLK -0.0012*** 
(0.0035) 
NON-CEO_BLK -0.0031*** 
(0.0038) 
DISP -0.2450*** 
(0.0054) 
SURPPRISE 0.0536 
(0.2743) 
SIZE 0.5240*** 
(0.0036) 
LOSS -7.5470*** 
(0.0041) 
NANA 0.1230*** 
(0.0069) 
HORIZON -0.0016 
(0.2574) 
STDROE -0.0015* 
(0.0814) 
EL 0.0748 
(0.1956) 
YEAR Included 
 
OUTDIR 0.0362*** 
(0.0035) 
INST 0.0791*** 
(0.0025) 
LITIGATE 0.0564 
(0.1247) 
MKBK 0.1476 
(0.2863) 
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 Coefficient 
N  9,905 
 
Adj.R2  0.2669 
 
Note: All the t-statistics are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors and 
clustering procedure by each firm. 
Model (1) is estimated by OLS. 
*** Indicates significance at 1 percent level; ** indicates significance at 5 percent level; * indicates 
significance at 10 percent level in a one-tailed test. 
 The estimated regression coefficients for other variables in 
the model are consistent with prior research on management forecast 
errors and bias. It is important to note that management earnings 
forecasts tend to exhibit greater forecast errors (bias) in a longer 
forecast horizon, but less so towards the actual earnings announce-
ment date. Similar to Kang et al. (1994), Das et al. (1998), Ajinkya 
et al. (2005), and Richardson et al. (2005), we observe that the re-
gression coefficient on HORIZON is negative and highly significant 
at p<0.01.This suggests that managers are more likely to be optimis-
tic with a longer forecast HORIZON. Accordingly, since our analy-
sis is based upon the most recent management earnings forecast of 
the year, it is likely that earlier in the year, management earnings 
forecasts may have an even stronger and larger degree of optimism 
as the management option compensation increases.  
It is important to understand that corporate governance or 
other monitoring mechanisms may affect the link between the man-
agement option compensation and the degree of optimism in man-
agement earnings forecasts. The estimated coefficients on outside 
directors (OUTDIR) and the degree of institutional ownership 
(INST) are positive and highly significant (p<0.01). This infers that 
these monitoring mechanisms may influence management to be less 
optimistic than they otherwise would be. This is consistent with 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005). The coef-
ficient estimates for industry litigation risk (LITIGATE) and market 
to book ratio (which proxy for pessimistic managerial forecast) are 
insignificant. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the story that stock 
option compensation may incentivize managers to issue optimistic 
earnings forecasts. When managers have high levels of option com-
pensation, they are more likely to issue an overly optimistic forecast 
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due to the resulting higher stock prices and higher values for the 
stock options they hold.  
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate whether the magnitude of manage-
ment's option compensation is linked to the managers issuing more 
optimistic earnings forecasts. Our results are consistent with our hy-
pothesized link between managers’ option compensation and opti-
mistic bias in their forecasts. We argue that since managerial com-
pensation is a function of stock price, and higher forecasted earnings 
usually result in a higher share price, managers have a strong self-
serving interest in issuing optimistic forecasts. Our inferences re-
garding the hypothesized effect of option compensation on forecast 
optimism are robust to including variables found to impact the earn-
ings forecast bias in line with prior research. Our results show that 
optimism bias in management earnings forecast increases as man-
agers' stock option compensation increases.  In addition, our results 
also suggest that the degree of optimism bias is somewhat offset by 
the corporate governance monitoring mechanisms. 
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Appendix: A 
Variable Definitions 
CEO_BLK =CEO options granted ($ - Black Scholes 
value), deflated by price, 
NON- CEO_ BLK =either chairman, CFO, vice president, or 
chief operating officer options granted ($ - 
Black Scholes value), deflated by price, 
BIAS =error in management’ earnings forecast, 
defined as the difference between the ac-
tual and  forecast earnings, scaled by price; 
If BIAS <0, the earnings forecast is opti-
mistically biased, 
DISP =the standard deviation of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts deflated by mean of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, 
SURPRISE =the absolute value of the difference be-
tween this year’s earnings and last years’ 
earnings deflated by stock price, 
SIZE =the natural logarithm of the market value 
of common equity, 
LOSS =code as 0 for firm-year observations with 
positive earnings and 1otherwise, 
NANA =the natural logarithm of number of ana-
lysts following the client, 
HORIZON =the natural logarithm of the number of 
calendar days between mean forecast an-
nouncement date and subsequent actual 
earnings announcement date,  
STDROE =the standard deviation of earnings over 
the previous five years. 
EL =earnings per share winsorized at 5 (-5), 
YEAR =the year in which the management fore-
cast is issued (dummies), 
OUTDIR =the percentage of the board of directors 
that are not officers of the firm, 
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INST =the percentage of the company’s aggre-
gate common stock held by institutions, 
LITIGATE =code as 1 for firms in the biotechnology 
(2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers 
(3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics 
(3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961) indus-
tries and 0 otherwise, 
MKBK =the ratio of market value to book value of 
common equity at the beginning of the fis-
cal year. 
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